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Knowledge spillovers and alliance formation 
 
 
Abstract  
Our study examines the conditions under which firms enter into strategic alliances subsequent to 
knowledge spillovers. We propose that spillovers serve as signals of knowledge dependence and potential 
complementarity, encouraging alliance formation to enable better learning and limit appropriation. We 
posit that the likelihood of a knowledge alliance subsequent to a spillover is contingent on the 
specialization of each of the firms in the knowledge involved in the spillover. We also hypothesize that 
the effects of such specialization on knowledge alliance formation are moderated by technological ties 
and geographic distance between the dyad involved in the spillover. Our results demonstrate significance 
for the effects of specialization, supporting learning and appropriation motivations. Technological ties 
strengthen while geographic distance weakens the relationship between specialization and alliance 
formation.  
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1. Introduction 
Alliances are a critical source of external knowledge for the firm (Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 1989; 
Khanna, Gulati and Nohria, 1998), enabling the development of new products and capabilities 
(Rothaermel, and Deeds, 2004).  Alliances arise when firms recognize opportunities for resource 
complementarity that are best exploited for rents through cooperative forms of governance rather than 
through market means or acquisition (Madhok and Tallman, 1998). One signal of opportunity is provided 
by knowledge spillovers, the unintentional and uncompensated exchange of knowledge among firms 
(Malmberg and Maskell, 2002).  Knowledge spillovers signal opportunities for access to external 
knowledge (Yang, Phelps and Steensma, 2010), by both originator and recipient, in the technological area 
of the spillover as well as in areas complementary to the spillover. Recent research provides evidence of 
firm recognition of this learning opportunity leading to the formation of alliances subsequent to 
knowledge spillovers (Stuart and Podolny, 2000, Stuart, 1998), but at the same time, spillovers 
themselves offer costless access to external knowledge (Zucker, Darby & Armstrong, 1998).This raises 
the question of why and when would firms replace a knowledge spillover with an alliance.  
As knowledge is a strategically important resource that contributes to firm competitive advantage 
(Grant, 1996), understanding the dynamics and management of knowledge transactions is important. 
Knowledge spillovers offer costless and ungoverned access to knowledge developed outside the firm, and 
are the basis for an extensive literature addressing the drivers and outcomes of uncompensated 
geographically localized knowledge exchanges (Zucker et al., 1998) in industry clusters (Tallman, 
Jenkins, Henry and Pinch, 2004). Spillovers clearly offer an important channel to access external 
knowledge. Many studies also have considered the effect of firm-specific knowledge stocks, similarities, 
and complementarities between two firms considering alliance (Inkpen, 1998; Rothaermel and Boeker, 
2008). However, these studies typically present the focal firm with the option of either allying or choosing 
not to share knowledge, ignoring the alternative of unintended and uncompensated knowledge flows. 
From a knowledge-based perspective, the bundling of complex, organizationally embedded knowledge 
and the creation of new joint knowledge is enabled by structured forms of governance (Kogut and Zander, 
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1992). Integrated structures, whether they are joint ventures or contractual alliances, improve 
coordination of knowledge and technology sharing, potentially enhancing the value of shared knowledge 
(Oxley and Wada, 2009; Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012). However, these integrated structures also bring 
with them risks of partner appropriation of the shared knowledge and administrative costs to minimize 
those risks, requiring a complex net value calculation to determine whether or not to ally (Madhok and 
Tallman, 1998). Our research addresses the transformation of a costless flow of knowledge from 
spillovers into a structured relationship for systematic knowledge transfer. This provides a fundamental 
view of the benefits of an alliance structure, since any transactional costs clearly are greater than costless 
access through knowledge spillovers, and the limitations of spillovers as means of knowledge transfer. 
Thus, our primary research question is, “What internal and external conditions increase or decrease the 
likelihood that two firms will enter into an alliance subsequent to a knowledge spillover between them?”   
We adopt the opportunity, motivation and ability framework with its implications for successful 
knowledge management (Argote, McEvily and Reagans, 2003) to explore the transformation of a 
knowledge spillover into an alliance. Opportunity for, access to, and control of complementary 
technological resources is signaled by the knowledge spillover. We then go on to consider the motivation 
and ability of both parties to the potential alliance, in contrast to studies of alliances that take a ‘focal 
firm’ perspective (Ahuja, 2000; Das and Teng, 2000).  Alliances are formed only when the interests of 
both partners are aligned favorably, suggesting a perspective of ‘it takes two to tango’. We assess 
participants’ motivation and ability by considering their technology strategies, i.e., the specialization of 
each firm in the technological area of the knowledge spillover. We posit that specialization results in 
differential learning possibilities and appropriation concerns on the parts of the originator and the 
recipient of the spillover. We further posit that the effect of technology strategy is shaped by boundary 
conditions of technological ties and geographic distance, between the members of the dyad involved in 
the spillover, that have implications for knowledge absorption and leakage.  
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2.  Spillovers, dependencies and alliances 
Knowledge spillovers represent the unintended and uncompensated flow of knowledge from an originator 
firm to a recipient firm that then uses the knowledge for its own innovative purposes (Griliches, 1992; 
Arrow, 1962).  For example, in the late 1980s, Abbott Laboratories invented a novel material and device 
useful in solid-phase binding assays to determine the presence or amount of an analyte in a test sample, 
and applied for a patent to cover this invention. Since the invention, a number of firms from a variety of 
U.S. and overseas locations, including Boehringer Mannheim, Miles Inc., Mochida Pharmaceutical, 
Hybritech, and SmithKline Diagnostics have utilized knowledge derived from Abbott’s invention to 
create their own inventionsi. In this case, knowledge spillovers occurred from Abbott to each of these 
firms as they capitalized on Abbott’s invention to further their own innovation efforts without 
compensating Abbott for its original investment.   
        Firms typically review the knowledge development efforts of others as they search for useful 
external knowledge to reduce their costs of innovation (Appleyard, 1996). Similarly, researchers, 
engineers and managers actively monitor how their ideas diffuse and are extended by others through 
mechanisms like patent citations (Garud and Rappa, 1994; Yang, Phelps and Steensma, 2010).  Thus, 
spillovers appear to serve as signals of knowledge and technology opportunities for both the recipient and 
originator. 
Knowledge obtained through a spillover and incorporated into innovative technologies by the 
recipient firm creates dependency on and potential for complementarity with additional knowledge 
resources possessed by the originator. While the knowledge spillover leads to disclosure of specific 
information embodied in the patentii, the high degree of tacitness embodied in a technological innovation 
(Teece, 1986, pg 287) generally means that this is incomplete disclosure. Since the recipient relies on an 
idea generated by the originator (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1999) and often needs additional tacit knowledge 
to fully absorb the idea (Zahra and George, 2002), this creates a dependency for the recipient. Indeed, 
knowledge spillovers have been used to document dependency on basic science or specific technologies 
(Carpenter and Narin, 1983).  
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Complementarity refers to mutual dependence and the ability to reinforce each other’s 
performance outcomes (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990).  The potential for the recipient to utilize additional 
knowledge resources – in the form of tacit knowledge associated with the spillover as well as other 
articulated and tacit knowledge – of the originator, in combination with its own knowledge base to 
enhance its innovative outcomes, creates possibilities for complementarity. The originating firm also will 
recognize similar possibilities for complementarity that could benefit it through access to the recipient’s 
knowledge base and through some means of appropriating at least part of the value of its lost knowledge. 
One way to accommodate mutual dependencies formally and to capitalize on complementarities is 
through the creation of inter-firm alliances (Gulati, 1995; Contractor, Beldona and Kim, 2011).  In 
accordance with prior literature, alliances are defined here as formalized co-operative relationships 
between firms that involve sharing, exchange or co-development and can encompass contractual 
arrangements or equity sharing (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Madhok and Tallman, 1998; Phene and Tallman, 
2012). Our research focuses on a subset of these alliances, knowledge alliances whose objectives 
explicitly involve knowledge access, knowledge sharing or collaborative research and development.  
 Under what circumstances do firms involved in knowledge spillovers shift the costless transaction 
to an alliance structure that entails administrative costs?  The fundamental issue of transaction cost 
economics is the governance and organization of transactions (Williamson, 1975). The choice of 
internalizing a transaction within a hierarchy or an intermediate form of governance, such as an alliance 
or joint venture, is determined by the conditions of the transaction (Williamson, 1979). From a knowledge 
based perspective, arms’ length ties do not allow complementarities to develop between knowledge 
resources; hierarchical forms are required (Kogut and Zander, 1992) to mitigate the uncertainties of 
markets. If the knowledge requires only partial contact between firms, or involves only a part of their 
knowledge bases, semi-hierarchical governance forms such as contractual or equity-based alliances may 
provide adequate integration with lower organizational and managerial costs than full internalization. To 
quote Oxley and Wada (2009, p. 635), “As external knowledge sources are increasingly global and 
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diverse, inter-firm alliances have become popular mechanisms by which firms access external 
knowledge.” 
 Early explanations for alliance formation focused on a cost-benefit analysis weighing the 
potential benefits from co-operation against the costs of managing the alliance (Buckley and Casson, 
1988). Alliances are inherently more expensive than are spillovers, as they involve the use of managerial 
and technical workers’ time and require some capital investment.  They may also create additional costs 
and risks of unwanted opportunism by the partner, involuntary leakage of technology, withholding of 
resources and efforts by partners due to difficulties of measurement and monitoring in alliances, and costs 
of supporting transfer of tacit knowledge (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Pisano, 1989). Thus, transforming a 
spillover to an alliance requires the expectation of some specifiable benefits at the firm level to cover the 
transactional costs associated with the alliance.  
These benefits are likely to be conferred by successful management of knowledge by the firm, a 
function of opportunity, ability and motivation (Argote, McEvily and Reagans, 2003). The knowledge 
spillover offers originators and recipients an opportunity to consider an alliance, as well as an incentive to 
avoid formal entanglement. For the originator, two views of alliances offer benefits to justify the costs of 
an alliance.  First, the knowledge spillover signals the presence of complementary technology resources 
available from the recipient that could, through an alliance, enhance the competitive advantage of internal 
knowledge assets (Narula and Santangelo, 2009).  Second, an alliance could enable the originator to 
appropriate some portion of the rents earned by the recipient from this current uncompensated transfer of 
knowledge and also to manage future spillovers preemptively. Alliances allow originators to apply 
measures of intellectual property protection (royalties, specified recourse, limits to search) through 
contracts or shared equity that go beyond those available from the inter-organizational trust and negative 
reputational effects in social networks and beyond the uncertain property rights conferred by patentsiii 
(Thambisetty, 2007).  
The spillover of such knowledge also points to opportunities for the recipient for learning and 
collaborative development with the originator. However, while a spillover may provide one piece of 
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technical component knowledge, successful application of this knowledge may well require, or at least be 
eased by, access to related tacit knowhow or complementary technologies from the originator that can be 
expressly obtained through a formal alliance agreement. At the same time, the recipient has an incentive 
to avoid the transfer of any rents from its knowledge bundle, including the spillover, to the originator, and 
so may wish to avoid deeper or formal ties. Thus, in the case of both members of a spillover dyad, 
learning and appropriation concerns of the firms may increase or decrease their inclination to transform 
the spillover into an alliance.  
These concerns are determined by the ability and motivations of the dyad firms to participate in 
the learning and knowledge management process. Ability and motivation to engage in learning are in turn 
enhanced by firm absorptive capacity, driven by the existence of prior related knowledge that the firm has 
accumulated (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  The technology strategy of the firm, that is, the extent of its 
specialization in the area of the spilled over knowledge, points to a stock of related knowledge that will 
enhance firm motivation and ability to engage in learning. We posit that technological specialization 
creates asymmetric motivations for the originator and recipient to engage in an alliance. Firms focus their 
attention on and specialize in core technology areas that are important to their innovation agendas and to 
firm success (Phene, Tallman and Almeida, 2012; Granstand, Patel and Pavitt, 1997). The unintended 
exposure of core technologies in which the firm specializes is therefore likely to inspire more aggressive 
efforts to engage in learning and collaborative development, as well to contain costs and recoup losses, 
encouraging alliance formation by the originator. 
Dyads engaged in spillovers exist in settings that may increase or decrease the influence of firm-
specific conditions.  As Sorenson and Stuart (2008) propose, interorganizational ties emerge atop a 
landscape of settings. Prior direct ties and proximity mechanisms are important factors in the process 
through which dyadic ties are formed (Rivera, Soderstrom and Uzzi, 2010).  In the case of knowledge 
spillovers, technological ties defined as prior knowledge flows and geographic distance (at the other end 
of the spectrum from proximity) between the dyad members should therefore directly influence alliance 
formation. We expect them to moderate the effects of specialization on alliance formation, because of 
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their ability to influence learning ability (Argote et al, 2003), and therefore to magnify incentives and 
concerns associated with specialized knowledge.  Technological ties enable similarity of knowledge 
processing systems and dominant logics in terms of problems pursued (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998) by 
increasing absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) for each others’ knowledge and by 
encouraging the development of shared knowledge through common practice (Brown and Duguid, 1991).  
Likewise, studies of geographical clusters suggest that co-location or geographic proximity and associated 
social networking enable the development of common architectural knowledge which enhances the 
comprehension and incorporation of spilled over knowledge (Tallman et al., 2004), while geographic 
distance inhibits knowledge flows (Jaffe et al, 1993).  
How do technological ties and geographic distance moderate the relationship between firm 
specialization and alliance formation? First, an originator may be more sensitive to and concerned with 
knowledge leakage in an area of specialization under conditions of dyad proximity. This is because a 
recipient in such a dyad is better equipped to capitalize on knowledge gained from the spillover as a 
consequence of improved absorptive capacity due to prior ties and proximity. In addition, firms in such 
dyads are more likely to be aware of each other’s knowledge development efforts (Saxenian, 1994). Loss 
of specialized knowledge to a technically tied or geographically proximate recipient is perceived as a 
greater threat than loss of such knowledge to a less technically tied or more distant recipient. Second, in 
such a dyad, an originator is better poised to learn from the recipient due to higher absorptive capacity. In 
this situation the originator may perceive greater potential for reverse learning from a recipient 
particularly when specialized technologies are involved.   Therefore dyad proximity through 
technological ties or lower distance is likely to magnify the effects of originator specialization on alliance 
formation.  
These conditions of proximity that increase motivation for the originator are likely to magnify the 
resistance by the recipient of specialized knowledge to alliance formation. In contrast, in dyads that are 
not tied or are distant, specialization of either partner will have a weaker influence on alliance formation.  
This model is expressed graphically in Figure 1 and is developed in detail in the following sections. 
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****************** 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 ****************** 
3. Knowledge and the firm – Specialization and transactional difficulty  
As proposed above, a firm-specific concern in the case of knowledge spillovers relates to the extent of 
specialization by members of the dyad in the knowledge involved in the spillover. On the one hand, Stuart 
and Podolny (2000) suggest that specialization may make alliance activity less likely due to fears that 
alliances will expose core proprietary knowledge.  However, specialization also has important 
implications for partnership opportunity, signaling the presence of complementary knowledge assets and 
better coordination ability.  Specialization has been demonstrated to facilitate coordination of learning 
processes in interfirm cooperation (Cantwell and Colombo, 2000), which is an important consideration in 
the creation of alliances (Inkpen, 1998; Heiman and Nickerson, 2004). Specialization therefore appears to 
create contradictory pulls, increasing concerns for protection from intra-alliance interactions and enabling 
coordination in alliances to gain the benefits of complementary technology opportunities.   
If an originator firm is spilling knowledge from one of the technological areas in which it 
specializes (i.e. an area where most of its technological activity is concentrated), it is more likely to view 
the recipient firm as a potential alliance partner for dual reasons of learning and control. Specialization in 
a core area of knowledge is a consequence of deliberate and significant resource allocation by the firm to 
that technological area. The use of the specialized knowledge of the originator by the recipient signals the 
presence of learning and collaborative opportunities for the originator in that technological area as well as 
in complementary and related technological areas.  Informal relational mechanisms may not be sufficient 
for providing mutual learning opportunities (Heiman and Nickerson, 2004; Narula and Santangelo, 2009).  
Learning through random spillovers is uncertain and an originator may therefore not rely on this option, 
for learning in or related to a key technology area. In contrast, alliances allow for closer coordination and 
enable mutual learning and joint knowledge development (Madhok and Tallman, 1998). Just as the 
presence of complementary resources and skills enhances incentives to ally (Arora and Gambardella, 
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1990), we expect that spillovers in the originator’s area of specialization increases motivation to ally due 
to complementary learning opportunities.     
 In addition to learning opportunities, alliances can offer the originator firm some opportunity to 
manage the appropriation of the returns to proprietary knowledge. In the case of a spillover absent an 
alliance, proprietary knowledge has already been compromised and exposed.  However, there is still 
potential for the originator to ensure that current and future exchanges are controlled. Even though we 
consider knowledge spillovers represented by patent citations that reflect codified and protected 
knowledge, ability to appropriate the returns to knowledge continues to be a concern. As the example of 
the Abbott patent demonstrates, several firms were able to capitalize on (and appropriate) Abbott’s 
knowledge, as represented by its patent, for their own objectives. Patents provide specified rights that 
allow for a temporary monopoly on the invention (either product or process) defined by the claims that 
the patent makes (Pressman, 2011), but firms can design around the claims laid out by the patent to create 
new products or processes and avoid infringement of patents (Teece, 1986; Pressman, 2011, page 428). 
Indeed, inventing around patents is a common problem (Oxley, 1999; page 40) and Teece (1986) 
concludes that patents offer little protection and do not work in practice as they do in theory.   
 Thus, recipient firms involved in knowledge spillovers can benefit from the articulated and 
protected knowledge of the originator without necessarily infringing on the patent. Additionally, flows of 
tacit and articulated knowledge tend to be closely linked and complementary (Mowery, Oxley and 
Silverman, 1996), further enhancing originator concerns regarding appropriation.  Although knowledge 
has already spilled over, there is an opportunity and motivation for the originator to use an alliance to 
appropriate returns that may result from the development of such knowledge by the recipient for either a 
future product or new knowledge and to pre-emptively manage future spillovers. 
 For the originator, relying on mechanisms of social sanction or on the uncertain property rights 
conferred by the patent represented in the knowledge spillover (Teece, 1986; Thambisetty, 2007) is risky. 
Alliance contracts, on the other hand, specify property rights over inputs and outputs (Grandori, 2010) 
and lay down general principles and codes of conduct (Grandori and Furlotti, 2006), thereby enabling 
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originators to wall off and prevent access to critical technology and reducing the leakage of technology 
unrelated to the alliance activity (Oxley and Wada, 2009). The key here is that a formal alliance offers the 
originator the opportunity to control the knowledge exchange (Narula and Santangelo, 2009) and prevent 
future losses while the uncompensated, uncontrolled spillover of this knowledge provides no such 
opportunity (Zucker, Darby and Armstrong, 1998). 
Therefore, despite concerns that alliances entail additional costs and risk the loss of knowledge 
beyond that intended to be shared between partners (Gulati and Singh, 1998), an originator firm is likely 
to consider an alliance subsequent to a spillover for dual reasons - in order to further pursue learning 
opportunities with its partner and to exert some amount of control over the current and future exploitation 
of its knowledge. We suggest that the benefits outweigh the costs of a formal tie in instances involving 
originator specialization and propose that greater specialization by the originator in the area of the 
knowledge spillover increases the likelihood of alliance formation subsequent to a spillover. 
H1: The greater the specialization of the originator firm in the technological area of a knowledge 
spillover, the greater the likelihood of a knowledge alliance between the originator and recipient firms 
subsequent to the spillover.  
On the other side of the knowledge transaction, recipient firms are not likely to be concerned 
about the possibility that they might be misappropriating the knowledge of an originating firm or its 
related returns, so long as they are not subject to legal penalties.  Indeed, for the firm receiving a spillover 
of technology, bolstering its technology at no cost might be considered the great benefit of such 
relationships (Arrow, 1962), particularly if the incoming knowledge is in one of its own areas of 
specialization. Thus, from an appropriation perspective the recipient firm in a specific dyadic transaction 
has little motivation to agree to an alliance or other formal mechanism for knowledge transfer and control 
since it can only result in its having to share its profits from the application of that knowledge. Alliances 
that involve knowledge transfer often require sharing of future innovations resulting from the original 
knowledge transfer, so the recipient firm could well find that its own future recombination-of-knowledge 
based innovations (Kogut and Zander, 1992) would have to be shared with its partner, the originator firm.  
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From an organizational learning perspective, recipient firms are likely to be concerned with two 
issues  related to ability to learn – first whether they can effectively understand and apply the spilled over 
knowledge, and second the additional complementary opportunities for learning from the originator. If the 
knowledge is in one of the areas of specialization of the recipient firm, the recipient’s absorptive capacity 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) for the spilled over knowledge as well as for complementary knowledge is 
likely to be high.  The absorptive capacity of the firm for external technological knowledge is dependent 
to a significant extent on the degree of its knowledge in a particular technological field (Schoenmakers 
and Duysters, 2006). Further the development and accumulation of tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1966) 
related to the technology is also dependent on specialization (Enright, 1991).  Thus a recipient with 
greater specialization will possess well-developed internal mechanisms for understanding and exploiting 
spillover knowledge.  
In addition, the recipient’s capacity to capitalize on complementary learning opportunities 
available at the originator is also expected to be high. Makri, Hitt and Lane (2010) show that in 
acquisitions knowledge complementarities between firms point to the presence of common knowledge 
stocks or greater absorptive stock, which in turn helps each of the firms recognize the value of 
complementary opportunities and assimilate them. We expect a similar situation in the case of alliances.  
Therefore the extent of specialization by the recipient in the technological area of the knowledge sector is 
likely to indicate the possession of sufficient articulated and tacit knowledge to enable the recipient both 
to utilize the knowledge involved in the spillover and to capitalize on complementary learning 
opportunities. The recipient is less likely to need access to supporting knowledge in this case than in the 
case of knowledge spillovers in areas where it is less specialized and that are less familiar to its own 
employees.  
 Madhok and Tallman (1998) propose that relational investment in cooperative ventures is largely 
about smoothing the way for knowledge transfer by increasing mutual absorptive capacity. However, in 
the case of spillovers of specialized knowledge, the recipient is readily able absorb and apply spilled over 
knowledge and exploit complementary learning opportunities, by relying on the large and very familiar 
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body of knowledge in the recipient’s specialty field. Therefore, and contrary to the motivations of the 
originating firm, the receiving firm is less likely to want to formalize a knowledge exchange through an 
alliance that entails additional costs in one of its areas of specialization. 
H2: The greater the specialization of the recipient firm in the technological area of a knowledge 
spillover, the lower the likelihood of a knowledge alliance between the originator and recipient firms 
subsequent to the spillover.  
4. Knowledge spillover context – The effects of technological ties and geographic distance 
In the previous section, we proposed that specialization of the member firms in a spillover dyad in the 
technological area of the spillover will influence the propensity for these firms to engage in an alliance 
subsequent to a knowledge spillover. We also believe that the contexts – technological and geographic – 
of the ties existing between the firms at the time of the spillover will moderate the relationship between  
specialization and alliance formation.  
4.1. Technological ties  
Given our focus on knowledge, we examine technological ties represented by prior knowledge flows 
between the dyad firms. Repeated knowledge flows between the originator and recipient are likely to have 
enhanced the receptivity and absorptive capacity of each for the other’s knowledge by developing shared 
tacit architectural understandings of the applications of technology and increasing similarity of knowledge 
stocks (Mowery et al., 1996; Tallman and Phene, 2007; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Brown and Duguid, 
1991). Our model controls for the direct effects of such ties on alliance formation, which have been 
demonstrated (Stuart and Podolny, 2000). In an extension of this prior research, we propose that 
previously existing technological ties between firms will moderate the effects of specialization on the 
likelihood of alliance formation post-spillover.  
Existing technological ties, or previous citations by the originator and recipient to each other’s 
patents, are directly related to the issue of spillovers and mutual dependencies. An originator is likely to 
perceive a recipient in a technologically tied dyad as a valuable opportunity because of the potential for 
the originator to engage in reverse learning from the recipient. Such a recipient is simultaneously 
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perceived as a significant threat by the originator, due to the recipient’s likely ability to utilize acquired 
knowledge effectively. Increasing levels of technological ties raise originator perceptions of threats and 
opportunities, more so when the spilled knowledge is in a core or critical part of the originator’s 
knowledge baseiv.  
Loss of specialized knowledge through a spillover to a technologically tied recipient is a 
worrisome prospect for the originator in contrast to loss of specialized knowledge to a less tied recipient 
on several counts. The technologically tied recipient has the ability to effectively utilize the specialized 
knowledge to mount a more urgent, proximate, competitive threat in the technological domain that is vital 
to the originator.  A recipient who has fewer technological ties may be unable to use the specialized 
knowledge because of lower shared knowledge and mutual absorptive capacity. Additionally, even if such 
a recipient is able to utilize some of the specialized knowledge, it may be put to use in a different 
technological domain, resulting in a less direct competitive challenge in a domain that is peripheral to the 
originator. Thus, spillover of specialized knowledge to a technologically tied recipient increases 
appropriation concerns on the part of the originator.  
This direction of argument also holds for reverse learning by the originator. An opportunity to 
engage in reverse learning through a formal alliance offers greater potential and benefits in the case of 
specialized knowledge spilled over to a technologically tied recipient. The originator has higher 
expectations of the extent and ease of learning from recipients that have greater technological ties to them 
than from those that have fewer ties when specialized knowledge is involved. Consequently spillover of 
specialized knowledge to a technologically tied recipient offers greater learning potential for the 
originator.  
 As discussed in the hypothesis for specialization (H1), specialization of originator in spilled over 
knowledge leads to greater learning potential for and increased appropriation concerns by the originator 
increasing alliance formation. In the case of spillovers of specialized knowledge to technologically tied 
recipients, both learning potential by and appropriation concerns of the originator are further magnified,  
and together  positively moderate the effects of specialization on alliance formation.  
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H3A: The positive relationship between originator specialization and knowledge alliance formation 
subsequent to the spillover will be made stronger by increasing technological ties between the originator 
and recipient. 
We predicted that the closer a spillover was to the core area of specialization for the knowledge 
recipient the less likely the recipient was to enter into an alliance. The negative effects of recipient 
specialization on alliance formation are likely to be increased by the extent of technological ties between 
the recipient and dyad. Technological ties raise the absorptive capacity of the recipient for spillovers from 
the originator beyond what its specialization already offers (Mowery et al., 1996), as they enhance the 
commonality of knowledge processing systems and dominant logics (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998), 
conferring additional advantages to assimilation by the recipient.  From the perspective of the recipient, 
this makes a formal alliance between technologically tied dyads for the purpose of consolidating already 
familiar knowledge even less likely to create value beyond the original learning from the spillover. An 
alliance in these circumstances may also raise concerns for a potential threat from an originator, uniquely 
positioned by its technological ties, gaining better access to the recipient’s specialized knowledge, thus 
leading to a reversal of the current roles in which the recipient benefits at the cost of the originator. The 
ease of utilizing specialized knowledge in a technologically tied dyad also makes the financial and 
opportunity costs of a formal alliance unpalatable.   
In contrast, a lack of shared tacit understandings and a lower absorptive capacity for spillovers of 
technology from originators with few prior ties suggest that when the incoming spillover is in a core area 
for the recipient, an alliance may be beneficial for the recipient in enabling the transfer of supporting or 
complementary knowledge. The opportunity to effectively utilize specialized knowledge by using an 
alliance with an originator in a less technologically tied dyad also will make the recipient less resistant to 
the possible costs of sharing future revenue that the alliance entails and to the actual costs of setting up an 
alliance. We therefore expect the negative relationship between recipient specialization and alliance 
formation to be made stronger by technological ties, such that increasing the extent of technological ties 
increases the negative effect of recipient specialization on alliance formation. 
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H3B: The negative relationship between recipient specialization and knowledge alliance formation 
subsequent to the spillover will be made stronger (more negative) by increasing technological ties 
between the originator and recipient. 
4.2. Geographic distance  
In a similar manner to prior technological ties, research documents the frequent interactions enabled by 
geographic proximity (Saxenian, 1994). Greater proximity or lower distance allows firms to experience 
economic benefits from “agglomerative efficiencies” in transactions because of such things as 
infrastructural development, an experienced set of suppliers and a common labor pool. Consequently, 
such firms tend to share both structural understandings and technical knowledge about the products and 
processes that are involved in the industry (Tallman et al, 2004). Geographic proximity facilitates 
knowledge exchanges through interactions enabled by social networks and the movement of labor 
(Saxenian, 1994; Zucker, Darby and Armstong, 1998).  Thus, geographic proximity increases, while 
geographic distance limits, the awareness of mutual knowledge dependencies, a common architectural 
knowledge, and increased absorptive capacity for spilled technology. A recipient in a geographically 
proximate dyad (similar to one in a technologically tied dyad) is therefore likely to be perceived by an 
originator as an opportunity to learn from and a threat to contend with, in contrast to a recipient in a 
geographically distant dyad. As Narula and Santangelo (2009: 395) say, “co-location…implies potential 
threat to the competitive advantage of collocated rivals, which strategic partnering may prevent”.  
 We propose that geographic distance moderates the effects of specialization on alliance formation 
such that it weakens the positive effects of originator specialization and the negative effects of recipient 
specialization. Originating firms will recognize that spillovers of specialized knowledge to other 
geographically proximate recipients are likely to result in direct and similar applications by the recipients 
because of similarities in understanding due to close, cooperative and competitive interactions (Maskell, 
2001). The originator will respond particularly aggressively to protect its exposed intellectual property in 
cases where spillover of its specialized knowledge is involved and where the recipient is geographically 
proximate, since this situation presents an immediate threat that could erode its competitive position in 
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that knowledge space. The originator will also be alert to the potential for a nearby recipient to generate 
rents from the application of the spillover knowledge and be motivated to appropriate at least some part of 
those rents.  Individual scientists in clusters do not give away their intellectual property to co-located 
firms, but tend to enter into contractual arrangements with these firms (Zucker et al, 1998) and the 
probability of such joint research arrangements rises contingent on the quality of the scientists’ work 
(Zucker et al, 2002). The potential for reverse learning from a recipient utilizing specialized knowledge in 
a geographically proximate area offers the originator an additional opportunity to recoup some of the loss 
from the uncompensated knowledge spillovers. Finally, physical proximity and similar practice are likely 
to keep costs of investment in the alliance low and increase the effect of specialization on alliance 
formation.   
On the other hand, in the case of spillover of specialized knowledge to a geographically distant 
firm, distance and resultant differences in knowledge capabilities (highlighted earlier) between the firms 
make it less likely that the recipient will use the specialized knowledge in a manner similar to the 
originator.  Consequently such spillovers present a weaker threat and simultaneously weaker opportunity 
for the originator.  The costs of alliance formation and management across a greater distance will further 
offset any perceived benefits of control or learning. Geographic distance will therefore serve to weaken 
the effects of originator specialization on alliance formation, making a specialized originator less disposed 
towards an alliance with a geographically distant recipient in a knowledge spillover.  
H4A:  The positive relationship between originator specialization and knowledge alliance formation 
subsequent to a spillover will be made weaker by greater geographic distance between the originator and 
the recipient.  
Specialization by recipient firms in the knowledge involved in the spillover makes them resistant 
to knowledge alliance formation. We expect this relationship to be strengthened in the case of geographic 
proximity between dyad members and correspondingly weakened in the presence of geographic distance.  
The benefits of capitalizing on uncompensated spillovers from the originator and utilizing specialized 
knowledge that is central to the recipient are magnified by geographic proximity. Proximity increases the 
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ability of the recipient to fill gaps in its knowledge through shared tacit understanding and mutual 
absorptive capacity with knowledge originators. The threat to competitive advantage of the originator 
discussed earlier works in favor of the recipient. In fact, an alliance formed under such cases makes the 
recipient vulnerable to future potential loss of its own specialized knowledge to an originator prepared for 
effective reverse learning by proximity. Consequently, the recipient stands to gain even less from alliance 
formation when specialized knowledge is involved and the originator is geographically proximate, 
therefore increasing the negative effects of recipient specialization on alliance formation in 
geographically proximate alliances. 
  However, when a recipient uses specialized knowledge from a geographically distant originator, 
it may be difficult to fill any gaps in the use of this knowledge that arise as a consequence of the 
differential development of knowledge processing systems across distances. Technical knowledge, 
although within the specialization domain of the recipient, may require additional understanding of 
complementary or tacit knowledge possessed by the originator. In such a case, reverse learning by the 
originator may also be hindered by distance, protecting the recipient’s specialized knowledge, should it 
choose to enter an alliance, in comparison to a proximate case. Therefore the negative effects of 
specialization of the recipient in the area of knowledge spillover on alliance formation are likely to be 
reduced for geographically distant originators. We therefore propose that geographical distance weakens 
the reluctance of a recipient to form an alliance in its area of specialization, subsequent to a spillover.  
H4B:  The negative relationship between recipient specialization and knowledge alliance formation 
subsequent to a spillover will be made weaker (less negative) by the geographic distance between the 
originator and the recipient. 
5.   Data and methods 
5.1 Data   
An extensive literature documents the phenomenon of knowledge spillovers, alliances and regional 
clusters in the U.S. biotechnology industry (Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996), consequently we use 
this setting for our study. Patent data is used to track knowledge spillovers and innovation in the 
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biotechnology industry.  Firms file patents to protect their intellectual property but another firm can then 
use the information from the public disclosure to create a new invention as long as it cites the original 
patent. No payment of a fee or compensation is required for citations. Patenting is important in the 
biotechnology industry and the U.S. is a significant source of these patents (Shan and Song, 1997).  Patent 
documents provide us with information regarding the firm that produces the innovation (assignee), the 
location of innovation (inventor location), the technology class, the timing of innovation (application date 
of the original patent) and timing of spillover (application date of citing patent).  Patent citations reference 
any and all relevant previous patents and represent the existing knowledge that a patent builds on. Despite 
findings regarding noise in patent citation data due to patent examiner added citations (Alcacer, Gittelman 
and Sampat, 2009), several studies assert the validity of citations as representations of knowledge 
spillovers and flows (Yang, Phelps and Steensma, 2010; Duguet and MacGarvie, 2005).   
 Our data sources included the BioScan directory, an industry reporting service by American 
Health Consultants that provides comprehensive information on biotechnology firms, the SDC database 
on joint ventures and alliances, company press releases and the Fleming Patent Dataverse for patent 
information.  We constructed our sample to include all U.S. biotechnology firms listed in Bioscan as 
operating in the human diagnostics and therapeutics segmentv.  We then identified every biotechnology 
patentvi (called original patent) under the U.S. patent system and originating from a U.S. inventor location 
that this set of firms appliedvii for in 1990, resulting in a set of 455 original patents filed by 102 firms.  We 
then identified all biotechnology patents citing (citing patentsviii) the original patent, where the assignee of 
the citing patent was a for-profit firm with a U.S. inventor location resulting in a sample of 1714 
observations, involving 102 originators(i.e. assignees of originating patent) and 233 recipients (i.e. 
assignees of citing patent). Our level of analysis is the knowledge spillover, i.e., a unique combination of 
an originating patent filed in 1990 and a citing patent filed within 8 years of the originating patent.  Our 
sample represents 317 unique firmsix and 617 unique dyads of firms and consists of the entire population 
of patent citations for the 1990 set of original patents, between firms within this industryx.  Our study 
encompasses a time frame that incorporates two windows. The first allows for the observation of 
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spillovers of the original patent within 8 years of 1990, and the second window for the observation of a 
knowledge alliance within 5 years of the spillover date. Thus the duration of our study covers a period 
from 1990 to 2003.  
5.2 Variable operationalization 
Dependent variable: Knowledge alliance formation. We collected data on alliance formation from three 
sources,  Bioscan, one of the twoxi most comprehensive, consistent and accurate publicly available data 
sources documenting alliance activity in the biotechnology industry (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005), the 
SDC database and corporate press releases. Our study covers all strategic alliances and includes 
contractual agreements and also alliances that involve equity investments. We first identified whether the 
two firms involved in a spillover entered into a strategic alliance in the five years subsequent to the 
spillover date (i.e., the date of the citing patent)xii by considering our three sources. If any of these sources 
indicated the formation of an alliance, we next collected additional data on the objectives of the alliance. 
Alliance objectives were classified as knowledge related if they involved a) knowledge access such as the 
1998 alliance that allowed Immunex access to Genetics Institute’s library of novel secreted human 
proteins or b) knowledge sharing or collaborative research and development such as the 1996 alliance 
between Schering and Smithkline Beecham for co-operation in the development of small molecule drugs 
and a gene sequence databases. We coded knowledge alliance formation as 1 if a) a strategic alliance was 
formed between the firms involved in the spillover within 5 years of the date of the citing patent and b) 
the alliance was formed for purposes involving knowledge access, knowledge sharing or collaborative 
research and development. This variable takes a value of 0 in all other cases, such as alliances formed 
purely for non-knowledge related objectives such as marketing, manufacturing or financing. Our sample 
involved 161 instances of alliance formation, out of these 109 were knowledge alliancesxiii.   
Independent variables 
Specialization of originator and recipient in technological area of the spillover. We determined the 
technology class of the originating patent and constructed our measure of specializationxiv  by the 
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originating firm, as the percentage of the originating firms’ patents in that technology class in the five 
years prior to the spilloverxv.   Specialization was constructed in a similar manner for the recipient firm. 
Moderating variables 
Technological ties between dyad members. For each observation in our sample, we identified all patents 
filed by both originator and recipient, in any technology class, in the two years prior to the knowledge 
spillover.  We then considered the citations made by this set of patents and identified those citations that 
were made by dyad members to each other. Prior knowledge flows is a count of prior citations by the 
originator and recipient to each other and measures the extent to which an originator and recipient have 
built on each other’s knowledge.  
Geographic distance between dyad members We collected information on the latitude and longitude of 
the inventor locationsxvi for the originating and citing patents in our sample from the Fleming Patent 
Dataverse.  Geographic distance between dyad members is measured as the geodesic distance scaled in 
hundreds of miles between the inventor locations of the originating and citing patent involved in the 
knowledge spilloverxvii.  
Firm, knowledge, and dyad specific controls. We incorporate several controls related to the firms, the 
knowledge and the dyad involved in the spillover. Firm co-operative capabilities enable the recognition of 
alliance opportunities (Kale et al, 2002). We therefore include controls for the number of prior alliance 
partners of the originator and recipient in the five years prior to the spillover. Interfirm co-operative 
activities can be attributed to the participant firms’ internal resource conditions (Gulati, 1998), in 
particular their innovative track records (Stuart, 1998).  The knowledge stock of the originator and 
recipient sends a signal of their viability for interfirm learning, and associated prestige as potential 
alliance partners. We measured knowledge stock as the total number of patents filed by the originator 
(and recipient) firm in the five years prior to the spillover.  Prospects for alliance can increase with age as 
the firm has a longer track record that potential partners can evaluate. On the other hand, younger firms in 
this industry may be attractive alliance partners since they can provide useful new leads for innovation. 
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We therefore control for age of the originator and recipient measured as the number of years from firm 
founding date to the date of the spilloverxviii.  
 We measure the value of the knowledge involved in the spillover between the two firms. This is 
operationalized as the number of citations received by the original patent (not including self citations) up 
to the date of the spillover.  Higher value, represented by citations (Trajtenberg, 1990) may signal the 
presence of other equally valuable knowledge in the originator firm and therefore is likely to favorably 
influence the recipient firm towards alliance formation. We control for the time lapse for the spillover as 
the difference between the date of the spillover and the application date of the original patent. A longer 
time lapse may signal lower economic value, as technology changes rapidly in this industry and may 
therefore reduce the likelihood of an alliance.  
 Our next set of controls relates to the dyad of originator and recipient firms in each observation. 
This industry is characterized by a clear distinction in the nature of firms, pharmaceutical firms and 
dedicated biotechnology firms (DBFs). Alliances between pharmaceutical companies and DBFs are 
common since they offer firms access to complementary resources (Arora and Gambardella, 1990).  We 
include a control to determine whether the knowledge spillover involves a dyad of a heterogeneous 
nature (i.e. a pharmaceutical DBF combination), coded as 1 or a homogeneous nature (i.e. both firms are 
pharmaceutical companies or both are DBFs), coded as 0. We used information regarding the prior 
alliance partners for each originator and recipient dyad to construct controls for common alliance partners 
and prior alliances. Studies suggest that firms choose to pursue alliances with those firms that are 
relationally embedded through prior direct ties and structurally embedded through connections to 
common partners (Gulati and Garugiulo, 1999). We therefore control for the number of common alliance 
partners shared by the originator and recipient firms in the five years prior to spillover.  We also control 
for the number of prior alliances between the originator and recipient firms that existed between the 
originator and recipient firms in the five years prior to the spillover. Since our sample involves 617 
unique dyads and 1714 observations, we have instances where the same dyad is observed in the sample 
albeit with a different combination of originating and citing patents. We therefore constructed a binary 
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variable for repeated entry by a dyad in the samplexix that takes on a value of 0 when the dyad enters our 
sample for the first time, and a value of 1 for every subsequent entry by the same dyad.  Dyad relative 
specialization was calculated by considering the absolute value of difference between specialization of 
the originator and the recipient firm in the technology class of the spillover relative to each otherxx. 
Higher values of this variable represent differences in the focus of the two firms involved in the specific 
area of the knowledge spillover. Greater technological distance between the originator and recipientxxi is 
likely to reduce the likelihood of alliance formation due to perceived challenges of enabling learning. We 
measure technological distance in terms of the differences between the firms’ technological positions.  
Following Jaffe (1989), we use the distribution of the firms’ patents over five biotechnology-related 
patent classes to characterize their technological positions.  The technological distance between the firms 
is then calculated as:  
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Pno is the percentage of originator firm’s patents in the technology class n in the five years prior to 
application date of the citing patent and Pnr is the percentage of the recipient firm’s patents in the 
technology class n in the five years prior to the application date of the citing patent. 
5. 3 Methods  
We use an event study approach to examine the likelihood of knowledge alliance formation subsequent to 
a knowledge spillover. Event history models model the hazard rate of an event while considering both the 
occurrence and the timingxxii of the event (Allison, 1984) and allow us to account for knowledge alliances 
formed within different years of the spillover (Cui, Calantone and Griffith, 2010).  This method also has 
the advantage of permitting the analysis of right-censored variables (Allison, 1984), as in our data some 
knowledge spillovers do not result in an alliance.  It is difficult to make a realistic assumption of the 
baseline hazard function for alliance formation and the Cox model avoids bias as it does not specify the 
form of the baseline hazard.  We therefore follow prior researchers who have used the Cox model because 
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of its appropriateness for analysis of alliance related decisions (Yeniyurt, Townsend, Cavusgil and 
Ghauri, 2009; Cui, Calantone and Griffith, 2010, Xia, 2011) and adopt the following Cox model 
formulation: 
hT(t) = λ0T(t) exp{βX(t)} 
where λ0T  is the unspecified baseline hazard, X(t) is the vector of covariates at time t. 
6. Findings  
Tables I and II present the descriptive statistics for our sample. 
****************** 
Insert Table I and II here 
 ****************** 
 Table III presents our findings regarding the effect of specialization on the likelihood of 
knowledge alliance formation, and Table IV presents the interaction effects and the fully specified model.  
****************** 
Insert Tables III and IV here 
 ****************** 
 The findings for specialization demonstrate partial support for our hypotheses.  With the 
exception of Model 2 of Table III, we find that specialization of the originator firm has a significant and 
positive impact on alliance formation, subsequent to a spillover, as hypothesized.  Hypothesis 1 receives 
partial support.  Specialization of the recipient firm has a negative and significant impact on alliance 
formation across all models, confirming Hypothesis 2. An evaluation of the coefficientsxxiii suggests that a 
unit increase in the specialization of the originator firm increases the rate of alliance formation by 6.39% 
while a unit increase in the specialization of the recipient firm reduces the rate of alliance formation by 
6.01%xxiv. The corresponding effect size in terms of an increase by one standard deviation for the 
originator specialization results in a significant increase of 353% in alliance formation. Similarly an 
increase by one standard deviation for recipient specialization decreases alliance formation by 84%.  Our 
findings indicate that originators are more likely to pursue, and recipients more likely to avoid, alliances 
when specialized knowledge is involved.  
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 We find that the interaction of technological ties and specialization of the originator is significant 
and positive, in Models 5 and 9 in Table IV. Hypothesis 3A is supported as technological ties increase the 
positive effects of specialization of originator on alliance formation.  In contrast, Hypothesis 3B receives 
partial support, as the interaction between technological ties and specialization of the recipient is not 
significant in Model 6, but becomes significant in Model 9, operating as expected to increase the 
resistance of a specialized recipient to alliance formation. The pattern of findings for geographic distance 
are similar to technological ties with significant negative coefficients for the interaction with originator 
specialization (H4A) in both Models 7 and 9 and a significant positive coefficient on the interaction with 
recipient specialization (H4B) in Model 9.  The findings suggest that geographic distance weakens the 
effects of originator and recipient specialization on alliance formation, as hypothesized.  Interpreting the 
coefficient of an interaction between two continuous variables in non-linear models is tricky and the use 
of marginal effects at representative values is recommended (Long and Freese, 2006; Buis, 2010; 
Williams, 2011). To interpret the coefficient on the four interactions in Model 9, we follow these 
prescriptions and present the marginal effects of specialization on alliance formation at representative 
values of technological ties and geographic distancexxv. These effects are presented graphically in Figures 
2-5.  
****************** 
Insert Figures 2-5 here 
******************** 
Figure 2 demonstrates that an increase in specialization by the originator of one standard 
deviation results in an increase in alliance formation by 6.1% when no technological ties exist between 
the dyadxxvi. As the technological ties increase, the effect of originator specialization strengthens such that 
when technological ties are at their maximum absolute value of 40, a one standard deviation increase in 
originator specialization increases alliance formation by 89.79%.  Figure 3 indicates that when recipient 
specialization increases by one standard deviation, alliance formation decreases by 12.72% in the absence 
of technological ties. As the technological ties increase, the effect of recipient specialization on alliance 
formation strengthens (becoming more negative) such that at the maximum value of 40 for technological 
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ties, a one standard deviation increase in recipient specialization decreases alliance formation by 
112.48%.  Thus technological ties operate as a moderator, strengthening the effects of originator and 
recipient specialization on alliance formation.  
Figure 4 indicates that when a dyad is geographically proximate (i.e. distance between them is 
zero), a one standard deviation increase in originator specialization increases alliance formation by 
56.12%.  As geographic distance increases, the effect of originator specialization on alliance formation 
weakens, so that when distance between the dyad is at a high of 2,400 miles, a one standard deviation 
increase in originator specialization leads to an increase in alliance formation by only 2.44%.  Figure 5 
demonstrates that when there is no geographic distance between a dyad, a one standard deviation increase 
in recipient specialization decreases alliance formation by 65.12%. With increasing geographic distance, 
the effect of recipient specialization on alliance formation weakens, so that when distance between the 
dyad is at 2,400 miles, a one standard deviation increase in recipient specialization leads to a decrease in 
alliance formation by just 17.76%.  These results offer support for the moderating effect of geographic 
distance which weakens the influence of specialization on alliance formation.  
 Of our control variables, we find positive direct effects of technological ties, alliance partners of 
originator firm, value of knowledge and prior alliances and negative effects of geographic distance, 
technological distance, dyad relative specialization and time lapse, consistent with our expectations.   
Alliance formation is negatively influenced by the knowledge stock of the originator firm, contrary to 
expectations.  Larger stocks may represent significant internal knowledge resources leading to a lower 
reliance on external collaboration for knowledge resources.   
To ensure the validity of our results, we conducted several additional testsxxvii. First, out of the 
109 instances of knowledge alliances we have 8 instances that involve alliances with more than two 
partners. To determine if the results were sensitive to the inclusion of multi-partner alliances, we 
conducted robustness tests by excluding the 8 multi-partner observations, and find that our results are 
identical. Second, we constructed a binary measure of geographic proximity that determined  whether the 
dyad in each of our observations represented knowledge spillover within or across clusters (based on 
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metropolitan statistical areas). Our results are robust to the use of the binary measure of proximity in 
place of the continuous geographic distance measure. Third, we ran our data using several alternate 
techniques, rare event logistic regression (King and Zeng, 2001), binary logistic regression and 
complementary log-log models instead of the Cox event study model and find identical results.  Fourth, 
our sample involves instances where the same dyad of an originator and recipient firm is observed in the 
sample albeit with a different combination of originating and citing patents.  While our model 
incorporates a control for such repeated entry, the intragroup correlation between observations 
represented by the same dyad may lead to clustered standard errors. Further, this dyad level clustering is 
nested within the firm level. We therefore use a techniquexxviii that accounts for intragroup correlation, 
corrects clustered standard errors at the firm levelxxix, and presents robust standard errors (Cleeves, Gould, 
Gutierrez and Marchenko, 2008).  Our results are robust using this technique. Fifth, our sample 
construction permits us to observe spillovers involving citing patents filed between 1991 and 1998. We 
included 7-year dummies for the year of the citing patent with 1991 as the base year instead of our time-
lapse variable. Again our results are robust.  Sixth, our measure of relational proximity considers prior 
knowledge flows between the firms in the two years prior to the year of the spillover. We also constructed 
alternative operationalizations that considered prior knowledge flows on the basis of 3, 4 and 5 years prior 
to the spillover and found robust results. Seventh, we tested our model by excluding the  control for 
technological distance between originator and recipient and find that our results are robust.  
7. Discussion and Conclusions 
Our study explored the conditions under which knowledge spillovers lead to alliance formation within an 
opportunity, motivation and ability framework (Argote et al., 2003).  Theoretically, we extend research on 
the organization of transactions by evaluating the conditions under which the knowledge transaction shifts 
from a spillover to an alliance. As Williamson  (1979, pg. 239)  states, “Use of a complex structure to 
govern a simple relation is apt to incur unneeded costs and use of a simple structure to govern a complex 
transaction invites strain.” Our study suggests that the benefits of learning and limiting appropriation by 
governing the knowledge opportunity signaled by the spillover, through an alliance mechanism, justify 
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the use of this structure.  The focus on the technology strategy of both participants in the spillover; a two 
to tango perspective and their corresponding asymmetric motivations, allows us to make a contribution to 
the alliance formation literature.  Empirically, our study offers new insights on the influences of 
specialization, technological ties and geographic distance on knowledge alliance formation, by 
demonstrating their complex, interactive effects.    
 Our study complements a number of streams of research in spillovers, inter-organizational 
learning, the role of geography, and alliance formation.  In the knowledge spillover arena, the focus has 
been on economic impacts on society and benefits for the recipient firm (Romer, 1990, Arrow, 1962).  
Our research extends this literature on knowledge spillovers by presenting a model that demonstrates 
effects of spillovers on co-operative strategies by the originator and recipient, responding to the call for 
greater examination of knowledge spillovers (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002).  Larsson, Bengtsson, 
Henriksson and Sparks (1998) point to the need to consider the strategic and dynamic aspects of inter-
organizational learning. Our study proceeds in this direction and examines a process of learning that 
evolves from knowledge spillovers to strategic alliances and explores the effects of internal and external 
contextual conditions on the process.  Yang et al (2010) propose and find support for originator firms 
benefiting through opportunities for vicarious learning from spillover knowledge pools. They suggest that 
this line of research may be extended by exploring how other inputs influence the ability to exploit 
spillover knowledge pools. Our focus on alliance formation subsequent to spillovers suggests that the 
process of capitalizing on knowledge spillovers may have an intermediate step of alliance formation in 
response to the most viable signals for knowledge exchanges. Thus, originator firms may establish 
alliances in those cases where they perceive the benefits from the spillover pool to be significantly larger 
than the potential costs inherent in an alliance and where they aim to transform vicarious learning to 
interactive and experiential learning by forging a formal connection with the recipient firm. Rothaermel 
and Boeker (2008) suggest that studies on alliance formation explore the interactions between dyad 
characteristics and firm level factors. Our study responds to this call by examining the moderating effect 
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of the relational and geographic proximity on the relationship between firm specialization and alliance 
formation.  
In Gulati’s (1998) critique of the alliance literature, he asserts that studies have focused on the 
competence of the firm as a factor that propels entry into an alliance but have placed less emphasis on 
factors that lead to alliance opportunities in the first place. Mitsuhashi and Greve (2009) suggest that 
current research offers limited guidance for managers in selecting promising alliance partners and for 
growing their alliance networks. Our study is a step forward in understanding how and when common 
knowledge interests might lead to alliance formation as it focuses on conditions when spillovers signal 
alliance opportunities and lead to the identification of new partners. Rosenkopf and Schleicher (2008, pg 
29) assert that, “alliances can be compared to the most visible tip of an iceberg above the water surface 
that rests upon a large body of ice (informal relations) hidden beneath the surface.”  They suggest that 
future research should explore other forms of informal relationships besides participation in cooperative 
technological organizations and board interlocks, and their influence on decision making by managers. 
Our research addresses this call by evaluating knowledge spillovers which are the outcomes of informal 
relationships of inventor mobility and social networking and exploring the influence of spillovers on 
alliance formation decisions. Our results provide support for their claim that formal interorganizational 
relationships reflected in alliances are the result of informal networks in which the firms and their 
managers and scientists participate. In this respect our study provides an interesting complement to work 
(Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn and Jaffe, 2006; Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996) that has focused on 
the character of knowledge flows between partner firms after alliances have been established.  Research 
by Katila, Rosenberger and Eisenhardt (2008) suggests that the pivotal issue of potential resource 
misappropriation at the stage of relationship formation has been largely ignored. Our theoretical focus on 
the perceptions of firms regarding appropriation prior to alliance formation addresses this gap. This is 
particularly relevant to the issue of spillovers of specialized knowledge in technologically or 
geographically proximal relationships.  Our research suggests that originator firms have alternatives to 
deal with spillovers beyond acceptance of loss of knowledge or exit from the cluster.  Appropriation of 
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some of the current value lost through spillover and pre-emptive management of future spillovers may be 
enabled by the formation of an alliance. Our study offers an alternative response for originators, when 
writing off intellectual property is not acceptable and relocation is not possible; consistent with 
transactional and resource based models of the alliance and with interesting implications for both theory 
and practice. 
 Our study has several limitations. We examine the conditions under which spillovers result in 
knowledge alliances. Although we do not examine whether spillovers lead to alliances, a question that has 
been explored by prior research (Stuart and Podolny, 2000; Stuart, 1998), we determined if this was the 
case by conducting a subsample test. We compared a subsample of observations, drawn by using 
stratified sampling, to a control group of observations without spillovers constructed by using propensity 
score matching. We found that the rate of alliance formation in the control group (without spillovers) was 
one third that of the rate in our subsample, suggesting that spillovers do increase propensity to ally. We 
use patent data to represent knowledge spillovers between firms. Some knowledge spillovers may not be 
captured as they may not result in patent citations.  Our sample is limited to originating patents applied 
for in 1990, a single year focus partly to accommodate the windows of observation for citations and for 
alliance formation resulting in coverage of years from 1990 to 2003. Given the emphasis on patenting in 
this industry (Shan and Song, 1997), a single year focus is unlikely to create a bias, however it would be 
interesting to extend the study to multiple years.  We focus on spillovers between originators and 
recipients in a single year, but many of our dyads demonstrate prior knowledge interactions as is common 
in this close knit industry (Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996).  The inclusion of our control for prior 
spillovers between the firms (technological ties) controls for the likelihood that the alliance is formed in 
response to an earlier spillover. We are not able to map an alliance to a specific spillover (or its 
originating patent) since this poses serious data challenges (Sampson, 2007).   
Our study also raises questions that offer potential for future research.  Knowledge spillovers are 
enabled by different mechanisms, such as inventor mobility, social networking and participation in 
conferences (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Saxenian, 1994), to name a few. Future research could 
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explore if the type of mechanism through which the spillover occurs is one of the conditions that 
influences alliance formation.  Spillovers in this industry also involve entities other than firms, such as 
universities, health laboratories and other research organizations (Audretsch and Stephan, 2002). An 
interesting question to explore would be whether the conditions that determine alliance formation with 
firms subsequent to spillovers also influence alliance formation with other entities. We used proxies for 
assessing learning potential and appropriation concerns.  Future studies could assess managerial 
perceptions of learning and appropriation and then evaluate their influence on alliances subsequent to a 
spillover to provide a more complete picture. Our study provides a pattern of alliance formation in the 
biotechnology industry where co-operative behavior is prevalent (Powell, Koput and Smith-Doer, 1996) 
and a strong intellectual property protection regime exists. A question for future researchers to consider is 
whether these patterns are similar in industries that demonstrate less co-operative behavior and a weaker 
protection regime.  
Our study has practical implications for firms to better manage knowledge spillovers by 
simultaneously protecting their core knowledge and increasing inter-organizational learning through 
alliances with new partners. It identifies conditions under which managers may be best served in 
capitalizing on opportunities presented by knowledge spillovers by partnering with spillover participants. 
Spillover roles in signaling opportunities and influencing strategic choices for collaboration may 
ultimately result in long-term positive effects for the originator firm.  Our results suggest that managers of 
originator firms should actively track and pursue recipients of the originator’s specialized spillovers as 
alliance partners, particularly when the recipients are technologically tied or geographically proximate.  
Recipients, on the other hand, are likely to avoid alliances under the same circumstances.  These 
circumstances suggest that managers on either side of the bargaining process must be prepared to 
negotiate intensely and effectively in order to enable alliance formation. One strategy for managers may 
be to seek out alters (either originator or recipient) in dyads where the spillover represents knowledge that 
manager’s firm specializes in but the alter’s does not. This prescription suggests that alliance formation 
after a spillover may be most viable when the two firms in the spillover have complementary 
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technological interests (necessitating the use of each other’s knowledge) but not similar specializations. 
An alternate strategy suggested by our results is for managers  to seek out specific alters in a specialized 
knowledge spillover dyad, who are less technologically tied or who are geographically distant in order to 
reduce resistance (on the part of the recipient)  to and retain incentives (for the originator) for alliance 
formation.   
In conclusion, our study offers a theoretical perspective on the transformation of knowledge 
transactions from spillovers to alliances and demonstrates that firm knowledge management efforts are 
driven by their technology strategies, and moderated by their technological and geographic ties to 
potential partners.  We propose and support a model that demonstrates the limitations of spillovers as 
primary channels for knowledge transfer. We confirm that alliances work to enhance learning, but we also 
show that their use supports the importance of controlling knowledge appropriation and future 
applications on the part of potential partners. While spillovers may indicate the opportunity for a 
knowledge-based connection, the motivations and ability of dyad firms to follow through have both 
positive (learning) and negative (appropriation) aspects. We believe that our framework offers an 
increasing level of sophistication in our understanding of the forces acting on knowledge transactions 
between firms.  
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Figure 1 – Theoretical Model 
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Note: The signs on the relationships are those expected on the coefficients of the independent variables 
and interaction terms in the regression model.  
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Figure 2  - Effects of originator specialization on alliance formation at different levels of 
technological ties 
 
Note: Standardized values of technological ties used 
 
Figure 3 - Effects of recipient specialization on alliance formation at different levels of technological 
ties 
 
Note: Standardized values of technological ties used 
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Figure 4  - Effects of originator specialization on alliance formation at different levels of 
geographical distance 
 
Figure 5 - Effects of recipient specialization on alliance formation at different levels of geographical 
distance 
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Table I Summary statistics – Means and standard deviations 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent variable   
Knowledge alliance formation 0.0635939 0.2440994 
   
Independent variables   
Specialization of originator 29.98 24.42 
Specialization of recipient 29.89 29.61 
   
Moderating Variables   
Dyad technological ties a  13.27655 29.53375 
Dyad geographical distance 10.50    9.79  
   
Firm controls   
Originator firm alliance partners 8.080513 8.203728 
Recipient firm alliance partners 5.565344 7.332929 
Originator firm knowledge stock 474.1534 744.0598 
Recipient firm knowledge stock 320.6989 645.8194 
Originator firm age 73.13 54.79 
Recipient firm age 55.92 57.37 
Knowledge controls   
Value of knowledge 15.46908 15.26759 
Time lapse 5.243874 1.820949 
Dyad controls   
Heterogeneous dyad 0.4014002 0.4903247 
Common partners 0.1417736 0.5999363 
Prior alliances 0.0303384 0.1814877 
Repeated entry of dyad in sample 0.6400233 0.4801333 
Dyad relative specialization 27.22553 22.89323 
Technological distance 51.86306 34.12861 
aMean and standard deviation of actual values reported in Table 1. Standardized values used in other tables 
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Table II Summary statistics – Correlations 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Knowledge alliance 1.0000           
2 Spec. of originator 0.0451 1.0000          
3 Spec. of recipient -0.1298 0.1431 1.0000         
4 Technological ties 0.1408 -0.0147 0.2033 1.0000        
5 Geographic distance -0.0772 0.0091 0.0740 -0.0634 1.0000       
6 Orig firm partners 0.0155 -0.1050 0.0519 0.0077 -0.0764 1.0000      
7 Recip firm partners 0.0177 -0.0264 -0.0838 0.0294 -0.0643 0.2827 1.0000     
8 Orig firm knowl stock -0.1090 -0.3259 0.2092 -0.0035 0.0405 0.2391 -0.0055 1.0000    
9 Recip firm knowl stock -0.0143 -0.0425 -0.2269 0.0534 -0.1049 -0.0251 0.2751 -0.0086 1.0000   
10 Orig firm age -0.1293 -0.1611 0.0943 -0.0871 -0.1163 0.4180 0.0847 0.3583 0.0596 1.0000  
11 Recip firm age -0.0132 0.0321 -0.1519 -0.0232 -0.2467 0.0399 0.4478 0.0483 0.4418 0.2521 1.0000 
12 Value of knowledge  0.1192 -0.1135 0.0040 0.3312 -0.0671 -0.1207 -0.2175 -0.0447 -0.1828 -0.2483 -0.3613 
13 Time lapse -0.0874 -0.1131 0.1529 0.2078 0.0424 0.4639 0.2633 0.0861 -0.1099 0.0469 -0.1261 
14 Heterogenous dyad -0.0183 -0.0636 -0.0328 -0.1757 0.2200 0.0721 -0.1841 0.1329 -0.1140 0.1196 -0.3326 
15 Common partners 0.0739 -0.0062 -0.0238 0.0845 -0.0582 0.3453 0.3821 0.0165 0.0887 0.1094 0.1726 
16 Prior alliances 0.0750 -0.0404 -0.0104 -0.0114 0.0323 0.0932 0.1055 0.0285 0.0355 -0.0454 0.0154 
17 Rep  entry of dyad  0.0560 -0.0754 0.1164 0.2430 -0.0159 0.0950 0.0474 0.0995 -0.0358 0.0049 -0.1299 
18 Dyad relative spec. -0.0497 0.3453 0.4148 -0.0026 0.1179 -0.1254 -0.1574 0.1542 -0.0866 -0.0930 -0.1033 
19 Tech. distance -0.0319 -0.1392 -0.3644 -0.0890 0.1091 -0.0557 -0.1733 -0.0055 -0.0492 -0.0852 -0.1775 
 
Continued… 
  12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
12 Value of knowledge  1.0000        
13 Time lapse 0.1319 1.0000       
14 Heterogenous dyad 0.1324 0.1100 1.0000      
15 Common partners -0.0681 0.1997 -0.1539 1.0000     
16 Prior alliances -0.0723 0.0094 -0.0254 0.0623 1.0000    
17 Rep  entry of dyad  0.3172 0.2741 0.0884 0.0131 -0.0086 1.0000   
18 Dyad relative spec. 0.0303 0.0180 0.1401 -0.0747 -0.0482 0.0229 1.0000  
19 Tech. distance 0.1959 0.0354 0.2912 -0.0837 -0.0793 -0.0128 0.2402 1.0000 
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Table III: Specialization and knowledge alliance formation 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Independent variables      
Specialization  of originator  firm  H1  0.010  0.042*** 
   (0.006)  (0.011)    
Specialization of recipient firm H2   -0.037*** -0.055*** 
    (0.006) (0.009)    
Controls      
Technological ties  0.447*** 0.455*** 0.669*** 0.779*** 
  (0.076) (0.075) (0.087) (0.089)    
Geographic distance  -0.030** -0.030** -0.017 -0.015    
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)    
Originator firm alliance partners  0.091*** 0.093*** 0.070*** 0.067*** 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)    
Recipient firm alliance partners  0.025 0.024 0.028 0.019    
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)    
Originator firm knowledge stock  -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)    
Recipient firm knowledge stock  -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003    
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)    
Originator firm age  -0.007** -0.007** -0.004 -0.004    
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)    
Recipient firm age  0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002    
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
Value of knowledge  0.016* 0.018* 0.011 0.017    
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)    
Time lapse  -0.487*** -0.491*** -0.440*** -0.436*** 
  (0.063) (0.064) (0.065) (0.066)    
Heterogeneous dyad  0.693** 0.656** 0.480 0.399    
  (0.253) (0.254) (0.257) (0.259)    
Common  alliance partners  0.099 0.082 0.112 0.087    
  (0.138) (0.142) (0.136) (0.147)    
Prior alliances  1.013** 1.050** 0.947* 1.120**  
  (0.357) (0.355) (0.372) (0.366)    
Repeated entry of dyad in sample   0.563* 0.603* 0.437 0.424    
  (0.254) (0.254) (0.259) (0.256)    
Dyad relative specialization   -0.014* -0.023** -0.001 -0.039*** 
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012)    
Technological  distance  -0.005 -0.002 -0.017*** -0.014**  
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
LR ChiSq  182.72*** 184.99*** 222.73*** 240.61***             
N  1714 1714 1714 1714    
Standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
Table IV– Moderating effects of technological ties and geographic distance 
  Model 5 Model 6    Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Interactions       
Tech. ties * Spec of orig. H3A 0.010*    0.022*** 
  (0.004)    (0.005)    
Tech ties  * Spec by recip.  H3B  -0.003   -0.016*** 
   (0.002)   (0.003)    
Geo distance  * Spec. of orig. H4A   -0.002***  -0.003*** 
    (0.001)  (0.001)    
Geo distance  * Spec of recip. H4B    0.001 0.002**  
     (0.001) (0.001)    
Independent variables       
Specialization  of originator  firm  H1 0.049*** 0.033** 0.059*** 0.043*** 0.062*** 
  (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014)    
Specialization of recipient firm H2 -0.065*** -0.045*** -0.057*** -0.061*** -0.062*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015)    
Controls       
Technological ties  0.456* 0.880*** 0.800*** 0.766*** 0.571*** 
  (0.178) (0.109) (0.090) (0.090) (0.159)    
Geographic distance  -0.015 -0.012 0.058** -0.027 0.056*   
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.022) (0.017) (0.022)    
Originator firm alliance partners  0.067*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.039    
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021)    
Recipient firm alliance partners  0.006 0.022 0.028 0.019 0.012    
  (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020)    
Originator firm knowledge stock  -0.002** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.002**  
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Recipient firm knowledge stock  -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002    
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)    
Originator firm age  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004    
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)    
Recipient firm age  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002    
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
Value of knowledge  0.019* 0.018* 0.024** 0.015 0.028**  
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)    
Time lapse  -0.394*** -0.441*** -0.425*** -0.427*** -0.288*** 
  (0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.066) (0.072)    
Heterogeneous dyad  0.231 0.411 0.247 0.399 -0.174    
  (0.269) (0.259) (0.267) (0.259) (0.289)    
Common  alliance partners  0.073 0.097 0.055 0.086 0.034    
  (0.155) (0.146) (0.157) (0.145) (0.175)    
Prior alliances  1.172** 1.081** 0.920* 1.108** 0.919*   
  (0.372) (0.362) (0.382) (0.369) (0.381)    
Repeated entry of dyad in sample   0.364 0.413 0.350 0.416 0.107    
  (0.257) (0.256) (0.255) (0.256) (0.262)    
Dyad relative specialization   -0.048*** -0.029* -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.041**  
  (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)    
Technological  distance  -0.013** -0.014*** -0.015** -0.014** -0.011*   
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)    
47 
 
       
LR ChiSq  247.22*** 242.67*** 255.19*** 241.62*** 290.30***             
N  1714 1714 1714 1714 1714 
Standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Notes 
i Abbott’s invention was filed by the company as patent 4916056, a remarkably influential invention that led to a 
number of subsequent citations.  
ii The knowledge spillover does not represent Arrow’s conceptualization of an information paradox for several 
reasons. Technological knowledge is very different from information, because it has elements of tacit, organization-
specific and cumulative aspects of knowledge that create a situation of incomplete disclosure (Dosi, Malerba, 
Ramello and Silva, 2006). Additionally, the value of the information provided in the patent is unclear in terms of its 
technological worth (Thambisetty, 2007). Patents vary in their worth and are less valuable as signals of quality of 
underlying invention (Trajtenberg, 1990). In effect, in the patent spillover the recipient is still unsure about the value 
of the information even after acquisition. 
iii Patents offer no guarantee of an exclusionary right, but merely a right to try to exclude (Lemley and Shapiro, 
2005) others from specific information embodied in the patent  
iv We do not dispute the direct effects of technological ties on alliances. However firms are limited in the resources 
that can be allocated for alliance formation and are therefore likely to emphasize alliance formation with recipients 
that use specialized knowledge from and are technologically tied to them 
v Our sample of 102 firms is representative of the number of firms in the human diagnostics and therapeutics 
segment in this industry for the time period under consideration. The biotechnology industry is comprised of firms 
operating in very different segments, including agriculture, food and brewing, veterinary, and human diagnostics 
and therapeutics (Powell et al, 1996). Since these segments differ researchers (Shan, Walker and Kogut, 1994; 
Phene, Fladmoe-Lindquist and Marsh, 2006) have recommended restricting samples to specific sectors in order to 
examine firm strategies. We follow this approach and focus on firms in the human diagnostics and therapeutics 
segment 
vi Biotechnology patents were identified as those patents where the first technology class was a biotechnology class.  
We use Granstrand, Patel and Pavitt’s (1997) study that classified patent technology classes into 34 industry fields 
and identified biotechnology patents as those from five technology classes (424, 435, 436, 514 and 530). 
vii The norm in patent data is to rely on the application (also termed as the file) date rather than the grant date, 
because it is a more accurate representation of when the innovation is created and when the spillover occurred 
(Almeida, 1996), due to the lags between application and grant dates (Clarkson and Toh, 2010). 
viii Citing patents were considered for a period of 8 years and did not include self-citations 
ix Some originators may be recipients (and vice versa) in other sample observations, consequently the number of 
unique firms in the sample is less than the total of unique originators and recipients.  
x Our sample does not include citations to non-corporate entities such as Universities and it does not include 
citations outside industry domains.  
xi The other source is the Recombinant Capital Database. Hoang and Rothaermel (2005) find an intersource 
reliability of greater than 0.90 between the reporting of alliances in the two sources.  
xii In the biotechnology industry there is a substantial time lag between patent filing and commercialization. This is 
particularly evident for our sample of firms in the human diagnostics and therapeutics segment due to the clinical 
trials required prior to regulatory approval. The complete R&D cycle from discovery to product launch can take 
between 10 to 20 years (Hine and Kapeleris, 2006). The focus of our study is the lag between patent citation and 
alliance formation. The appropriate lag in this case may be shorter since a) it already allows for the time lag from the 
originating patent application date to the citing patent application date, that ranges from 1 to 8 years and b) many 
alliances are formed prior to and in anticipation of product launch. Powell et al (1996) point to the use of alliances 
for knowledge related purposes including R&D in the biotechnology industry. We focus on knowledge related 
alliances and in this context an eight year time lag between citation and alliance formation appears reasonable.  
xiii Our results are robust to the use of alliance formation (any type of alliance) instead of knowledge alliance 
formation. 
xiv We use the term specialization to describe areas of technology that are the focus of the knowledge activities, as 
measured by patent counts, of the firm in question, as opposed to a qualitative judgment of firm innovation. 
xv The rationale for using a stock rather than an annual measure is fairly well established in the patent literature 
(Henderson and Cockburn, 1994) and a five year measure is the norm in studies using patent data (Almeida and 
Phene, 2004).   
xvi The inventor location from the patent document allows us to pinpoint the location of innovation in contrast to the 
assignee location that typically represents firm headquarters. This is particularly useful to identify the originating 
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and recipient location of the knowledge spillover in the case of large firms with multiple research locations. We 
follow prior research (Almeida, 1996) that uses inventor location to identify the source of innovation.   
xvii We use the Vincenty program in Stata to calculate geodesic distance from the latitude and longitude of the two 
locations 
xviii We also collected information on originator and recipient firm size (measured as the log of number of 
employees). These measures are highly correlated with age at 0.83 for originator and at 0.87 for recipient. We 
therefore include only originator and recipient age in our models. Our results are robust when we use originator and 
recipient firm size instead of age.  
xix We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion 
xx We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion 
xxi Technological distance represents the difference/similarity between originator and recipient patent portfolios, 
which is different from our technological ties measure that reflects the extent to which the two rely on each other for 
their knowledge building. Two firms could be technologically similar yet not draw on knowledge from the other, 
resulting in fewer technological ties and vice versa. Technological distance is also distinct from the dyad relative 
specialization measure. The former focuses on difference or similarity of the two firms across all their knowledge 
areas, while the latter represents the extent to which they overlap in the knowledge area of the spillover. 
xxii Our data records alliance formation in a particular year (not at the exact date), resulting in time being measured in 
discrete time units (corresponding to years) rather than as a continuous variable.  Although the use of binary logistic 
or complementary log log models is suggested in these cases (Allison, 1982; Powers and Xie, 2000), discrete time 
methods virtually always give similar results to continuous time methods and the discrete time model converges to a 
proportional hazards model (Allison, 1984).   
xxiii Calculations of effect sizes are based on the fully specified Model, i.e. Model 9 in Table IV 
xxiv The tables present the co-efficients for our models using the nohr (i.e. no hazard ratios) option in Stata. The nohr 
option returns co-efficients not hazard ratios. To interpret these co-efficients, it is first necessary to calculate the 
hazard ratio by using the following formula: Hazard ratio for a variable = Exp(Co-efficient of  variable  * Desired 
units of change in variable). Next the effect on the variable is calculated as a) 100 – Hazard ratio* 100 (if the hazard 
ratio is less than 1) or b) Hazard ratio * 100 – 100 (if the hazard ratio is more than 1). The difference is the expected 
percentage decrease (in a option )/ increase (in b option) in rate of the dependent variable (Cleves, Gould, Gutierrez, 
Marchenko; 2008)   
xxv In order to select the representative values for technological ties and geographic distance, we considered the 
mean and standard deviation of these variables and created a range that would encompass this spectrum.  
xxvi We use standardized values of technological ties in our models. The standardized value of -0.45corresponds to 
an absolute value of 0 for this variable and the standardized value of 0.9 corresponds to an absolute value of 40. 
xxvii These tables are not presented due to space considerations but are available from the authors on request 
xxviii We use the vce(cluster) option in our modeling package, Stata. 
xxix Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011) note that in the case of nested two way or multiway clustering, “one simply 
clusters at the highest level of aggregation” (page 238).  Our sample represents multi way clustering – at the firm, 
dyad and spillover level. The highest level of clustering is at the firm level, and the dyad and spillover are nested 
within this level (i.e. there can be no dyad or spillover cluster without a common firm). We therefore cluster at the 
firm level. 
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